Fordham Law Review
Volume 86

Issue 2

Article 8

2017

Entertaining Satan: Why We Tolerate Terrorist Incitement
Andrew Koppelman
Northwestern University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Computer Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons,
Criminal Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew Koppelman, Entertaining Satan: Why We Tolerate Terrorist Incitement, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 535
(2017).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol86/iss2/8

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

ENTERTAINING SATAN:
WHY WE TOLERATE
TERRORIST INCITEMENT
Andrew Koppelman*
Words are dangerous. That is why governments sometimes want to
suppress speech. The law of free speech reflects a settled decision that, at the
time that law was adopted, the dangers were worth tolerating. But people
keep dreaming up nasty new things to do with speech.
Recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other terrorist
organizations have employed a small army of Iagos on the internet to recruit
new instruments of destruction.1 Some of what they have posted is protected
speech under present First Amendment law. In response, scholars have
suggested that there should be some new exception to the law of free speech.2
Thus far, no workable exception has been suggested.
American free speech law could ban certain noxious forms of incitement,
as has been done in other countries.3 But in doing that, we would, to a certain
extent, give up being a nation of adults.
Anwar al-Awlaki, a planner of terrorist operations forAl Qaeda who was
eventually killed by an American drone strike, maintained a website that
defended terrorist violence.4 One of its readers was Nidal Hassan, who also
exchanged emails with al-Awlaki.5 None of the email exchanges were
explicitly conspiratorial, and no immediate plans were discussed.6 Hassan

* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Northwestern
University. Thanks to Martin Redish for comments on an earlier draft. Portions of this Article
are revised from an earlier piece in the Northwestern Law Review. See Andrew Koppelman, A
Free Speech Response to the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1125
(2016). This Article was prepared for the Fordham Law Review symposium entitled Terrorist
Incitement on the Internet held at Fordham University School of Law. For an overview of the
symposium, see Alexander Tsesis, Foreword: Terrorist Incitement on the Internet, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 367 (2017).
1. See generally GABRIEL WEIMANN, TERROR ON THE INTERNET: THE NEW ARENA, THE
NEW CHALLENGES (2006).
2. See, e.g., infra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
3. Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 35 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
4. Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN. L. REV.
1145, 1167–68 (2013).
5. Id.
6. Id. (reporting that the email exchanges “gave no indication that [Nidal Hassan] had
any immediate plans to carry out . . . an attack”).
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eventually shot to death thirteen soldiers at Fort Hood in Texas.7 Later, alAwlaki defended the killing spree as “a heroic act” and “a wonderful
operation.”8
Ali Amin, a lonely Virginia teenager, was drawn into the virtual world of
ISIS, where he found a welcoming community.9 Eventually he was induced
to provide logistical support, showing the organization how to secretly
transfer funds and driving one recruit to the airport.10 He was convicted of
material support of terrorism and sentenced to eleven years in prison.11
American free speech doctrine will not permit this speech to be
criminalized, so long as it falls short of direct solicitation or conspiracy.
Incitement to law violation is constitutionally protected, unless it falls within
the narrow Brandenburg v. Ohio12 exception: “the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.”13 Imminent means really imminent; even an indefinite
time later in the day does not satisfy the standard.14
Generalized praise of ISIS, or even of terrorist violence, is protected
speech. Brandenburg allows people to preach
that the Islamic State is a social movement devoted to protecting Muslims
and fighting an unfair global economic system; that it does not discriminate
on the basis of race or nationality; that it uses violence in self-defense and
in ways that mimic Western films and video games; and that Westerners
who join the fight in Syria and Iraq are normal people fighting a just war.15

Why should free speech doctrine ever tolerate speech that advocates violation
of the law? And if it ever tolerates it, why draw the line here?
Government tries to censor speech because it thinks, often reasonably, that
the speech will cause something bad to happen. Before the development of
modern free speech law, speech could be punished “[i]f the natural and

7. Id. at 1168.
8. Id. at 1167–68.
9. Scott Shane et al., Americans Attracted to ISIS Find an ‘Echo Chamber’ on Social
Media, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/us/americansattracted-to-isis-find-an-echo-chamber-on-social-media.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/D9ELLVFA].
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
13. Id. at 448.
14. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that advocating for
illegal activity at an indefinite time in the future is not imminent); see also NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) (“This Court has made clear, however,
that mere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove speech from the protection
of the First Amendment.”). A few recent lower court cases have dramatically relaxed the
imminence requirement, but these are inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court doctrine and are
unlikely to endure. See Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 655, 669–70 (2009).
15. Shane et al., supra note 9.
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reasonable effect of what is said is to encourage resistance to a law.”16 But
as Justice Louis Brandeis observed, this test bars any criticism of the status
quo: “Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase
the probability that there will be a violation of it.”17
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes made a more general point: “Every idea is
an incitement. It offers itself for belief, and if believed, it is acted on unless
some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement
at its birth.”18 If government can suppress speech that is likely to produce
law violation, then it can suppress any speech that criticizes the law on the
books—and that is the end of democracy. The Brandenburg standard was
adopted in response to that problem.19 Does it allow too much?
The trouble with an insistence on imminence was explained long ago by
Justice Edward T. Sanford:
[T]he immediate danger is none the less real and substantial because the
effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The State cannot
reasonably be required to measure the danger from every such utterance in
the nice balance of a jeweler’s scale. A single revolutionary spark may
kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and
destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the State is acting
arbitrarily or unreasonably when, in the exercise of its judgment as to the
measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety, it seeks to
extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or
blazed into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to defer the
adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary
utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and
immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its
judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency.20

Sanford could have been talking about ISIS. So could Robert Bork:
“Cumulatively [dangerous utterances] may have enormous influence, and yet
it may well be impossible to show any effect from any single example.”21
Laurence Tribe is too sanguine when he writes that the imminence
requirement is “an additional safeguard for the harmless inciter.”22 Some
inciters whom Brandenburg protects are not harmless. Rodney Smolla,
defending Brandenburg, observes that “[g]overnments at all places and at all
times tend to exaggerate dangers when they move against speech,” and that
“[i]n virtually every freedom of speech case involving political dissent that
16. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 38 (2d Cir. 1917). The court also required “the
words [to be] used in an endeavor to persuade to resistance,” but since it left that question to
the jury, it was not much of a barrier to prosecuting unpopular speakers. Id.
17. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
18. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19. James Weinstein, The Story of Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten: Judge Learned Hand,
First Amendment Prophet, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 61, 78–83 (Richard Garnett &
Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012).
20. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669 (majority opinion).
21. Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
33 (1971). For a similar objection, see LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION? 76–77 (2005).
22. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-09, at 849 (2d ed. 2000).
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has ever reached the United States Supreme Court for resolution, no palpable
harm ever in fact occurred.”23 That is not true of terrorist incitement. There
have been serious harms, and more are probably coming.
The law is not utterly helpless to deal with terrorist propaganda on the web.
Some of it may rise to the level of conspiracy and solicitation. Some may
incite imminent lawless conduct and so may be unprotected under
Brandenburg. Some may constitute true threats—another unprotected
category of speech. Some may constitute material support for terrorism,
which is unprotected even when it consists of speech.24 But quite a lot of
terrorist incitement does not fall into any of these categories. So where to
draw the line?
The problem is a tough one, and I cannot solve it. I can say that the
modifications of free speech law that have been proposed do not solve it.
Cass Sunstein would get rid of Brandenburg’s imminence requirement: “If
(and only if) people are explicitly inciting violence, perhaps their speech does
not deserve protection when (and only when) it produces a genuine risk to
public safety, whether imminent or not.”25 As we have already seen,
however, long-term risk is hard to assess. Sunstein’s proposal is not as bad
as the old “natural and reasonable effect” test,26 but it does authorize the same
kind of judicial guesswork. One would want a reason to believe that this
modification of Brandenburg would do good in some actual case. In the
stories of terrorist incitement that have motivated our inquiry, the speakers
have always been overseas, beyond the jurisdiction of American courts.
Creating a new category of unprotected speech will not help if the law cannot
reach the speakers.
Eric Posner responds to this difficulty by targeting readers, not speakers.27
He proposes
a law that makes it a crime to access websites that glorify, express support
for, or provide encouragement for ISIS or support recruitment by ISIS; to
distribute links to those websites or videos, images, or text taken from those
websites; or to encourage people to access such websites by supplying them
with links or instructions.28

23. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 116 (1992); see DANIEL
FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 70–71 (3d ed. 2010).
24. See Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651 (2017)
(analyzing these categories and discussing their applicability).
25. Cass R. Sunstein, Islamic State’s Challenge to Free Speech, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 23,
2015), https://origin-www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-23/islamic-state-s-challenge
-to-free-speech [http://perma.cc/E28U-2VDY].
26. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919) (holding that a person can be
convicted of incitement if illegal conduct was the “natural tendency and reasonably probable
effect” of the speech).
27. Posner’s skepticism about the Brandenburg standard is also developed in ERIC A.
POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE
COURTS 230–34 (2007).
28. Eric Posner, ISIS Gives Us No Choice but to Consider Limits on Speech, SLATE (Dec.
15,
2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/
12/isis_s_online_radicalization_efforts_present_an_unprecedented_danger.html
[http://perma.cc/RM8X-FTS2].
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There is, of course, a problem of notice: how can one tell whether the
website one is looking at crosses the line? Posner suggests the following
solution:
The law would provide graduated penalties. After the first violation, a
person would receive a warning letter from the government; subsequent
violations would result in fines or prison sentences. The idea would be to
get out the word that looking at ISIS-related websites, like looking at
websites that display child pornography, is strictly forbidden.29

But if the authorities know that someone is spending time with this
material, then less draconian responses immediately suggest themselves. Ali
Amin was seventeen years old.30 Had his parents been told what he was
doing, they could have intervened very effectively. More generally, when
consumers of this material are detected, there are plenty of ways to respond
to them without criminalizing the underlying speech.
Posner acknowledges that scholars and journalists may have legitimate
reasons for wanting to look at terrorist incitement on the internet. He
responds by trying to define a class of privileged readers: “[T]he law could
contain broad exemptions for people who can show that they have a
legitimate interest in viewing ISIS websites. Press credentials, a track record
of legitimate public commentary on blogs and elsewhere, academic
affiliations, employment in a security agency, and the like would serve as
adequate proof.”31 Evidently we would get a modern analogue of the old
Catholic Index of Forbidden Books, which could be read only with
permission from the sacred congregation of the Roman Inquisition.32
The law cannot reach the speakers. If it detects the listeners, and the speech
has not yet risen to the level of conspiracy, then there is a lot that you can do
short of punishment for that subset of listeners—no one knows how large a
subset—who present a danger. But why protect this worthless, dangerous
speech in the first place?
In modern free speech theory, there has been a persistent puzzle about
whether those who reject democracy are entitled to free speech.33 Alexander
Meiklejohn offered the classic response: “A government is maintained by
the free consent of its citizens only so long as the choice whether or not it
shall be maintained is recognized as an open choice, which the people may
debate and decide, with conflicting advocacies, whenever they may
choose.”34 Meiklejohn’s argument is essentially the same as John Milton’s
original defense of free speech offered in 1644: in order for the choice of

29. Id.
30. See Shane et al., supra note 9.
31. Id.
32. Index
Librorum
Prohibitorum,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Index-Librorum-Prohibitorum
[http://perma.cc/NC6EPVMA] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
33. Carl A. Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political
Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173, 186–89 (1956); Bork, supra note 21, at 31.
34. Alexander Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV.
461, 468 (1953).
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good to be authentic, there must be a real option to choose evil.35 People
must learn to cope with evil thoughts. “He that can apprehend and consider
vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet
distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true warfaring
Christian.”36 The way to be virtuous is “to ordain wisely as in this world of
evil, in the midst whereof God hath placed us unavoidably.”37
God thus allowed the serpent to tempt Adam and Eve. That did not go
well. Some proponents of free speech have been forthright about the dangers.
Justice Holmes wrote that free speech “is an experiment, as all of life is an
experiment.”38 Justice Brandeis thought that maintaining a free society
required courage.39
Whenever people are treated as adults, with the power to make their own
choices, they may make them badly. The value of free speech is that it
enables us to be awake, to be conscious of what we are doing, and to be aware
of the options available to us. Treating people as adults is dangerous because
we do not know what they will do if they entertain Satanic ideas or allow
themselves to be entertained by those ideas. Some people visit Islamic
radical websites out of pure curiosity. It is impossible for a censor to know
what effect any text will have on its audience, because readers are so
diverse.40
Recent work on the cultural specificity of ideals of free speech and their
roots in dissenting Protestantism raises the question whether the idea of free
speech has anything to offer to non-Western civilizations.41 Democracy
provides a familiar answer: authoritarian government has the same
pathologies everywhere, and official accountability is impossible without
35. The Miltonic roots of Meiklejohn are elaborated in Andrew Koppelman, You’re All
Individuals: Brettschneider on Free Speech, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1023, 1027 (2014). Another
similarly Miltonic formulation is as follows:
If men are not free to ask and to answer the question, “Shall the present form of our
government be maintained or changed?”; if, when that question is asked, the two
sides of the issue are not equally open for consideration, for advocacy, and for
adoption, then it is impossible to speak of our government as established by the free
choice of a self-governing people.
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 123 (1960).
36. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprinted in JOHN MILTON: COMPLETE POEMS
AND MAJOR PROSE 716, 728 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., 1957).
37. Id. at 733.
38. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
39. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
See generally Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The
Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988).
40. See Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1635, 1662 (2005); Andrew Koppelman, Eros, Civilization, and Harry Clor, 31 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 855, 863–64 (2007).
41. See, e.g., JOHN DURHAM PETERS, COURTING THE ABYSS: FREE SPEECH AND THE
LIBERAL TRADITION 93 (2005) (“Comparative modernization studies suggest that cultures with
strong support for free expression are clustered in the Protestant cultural zone of northern
Europe and America, plus Australia and New Zealand, and even there it does not have uniform
support. For Africa, Latin America, southern and eastern Europe, and Asia, absolutist
tolerance of offense is rarely the majority public opinion.”).

2017]

ENTERTAINING SATAN

541

free speech. But another answer is that free speech provides an opportunity
to close the “gulf that separates class from class and soul from soul,”42 as
George Bernard Shaw’s Henry Higgins put it. Seana Shiffrin argues that,
“given that our minds are not directly accessible to one another, speech and
expression are the only precise avenues by which one can be known as the
individual one is by others.”43 Censorship enacts “a sort of solitary
confinement outside of prison but within one’s mind.”44 Because free
communication is essential to avoid this pathology, it is a fundamental human
right.45
Free speech welcomes the open collision of moral views, which many
people will find troubling. When John Stuart Mill’s classic defense of free
speech balances liberty against harm, Jeremy Waldron has observed, that
balancing cannot count the moral distress of having your most cherished
views denounced as harm or of contemplating ways of life antithetical to your
own.46 A core value of free speech is that it will and must induce such
distress. Mill, and liberalism more generally, places great value on “ethical
confrontation—the open clash between earnestly held ideals and opinions
about the nature and basis of the good life.”47 Moral distress, “far from being
a legitimate ground for interference, . . . is a positive and healthy sign that the
processes of ethical confrontation that Mill called for are actually taking
place.”48 Part of the reason for protecting illiberal ideas is that they promise
to induce that distress.49
Free speech aims to create a distinctive kind of human character—open to
all ideas, inquisitive, ready to be challenged—and a social environment in
which that kind of character can thrive.50 One cultivates that character by
encountering ideas radically at odds with one’s own. Mill observes that in
order to do that, one
must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who
defend them in earnest and do their very utmost for them. He must know
them in their most plausible and persuasive form; he must feel the whole
force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter
42. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, PYGMALION (1913), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SHAW:
COMPLETE PLAYS WITH PREFACES 189, 248 (1962).
43. SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW
88–89 (2014).
44. Id. at 91.
45. Id. at 117.
46. See Jeremy Waldron, Mill and the Value of Moral Distress, in LIBERAL RIGHTS:
COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991, at 115, 119–20 (1993).
47. Id. at 120.
48. Id. at 125. Waldron’s more recent call for restriction of hate speech is in tension with
this argument. See Andrew Koppelman, Waldron, Responsibility-Rights, and Hate Speech, 43
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1201, 1215–21 (2012).
49. This is one reason why the protection of dissent is so central to the free speech
tradition. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 87
(1990).
50. Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the
Present, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 60, 61 (Lee C. Bollinger
& Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002); Andrew Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance: Tunnel
Constructivism in Free Speech Theory, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 647, 707–15 (2013).
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and dispose of; else he will never really possess himself of the portion of
truth which meets and removes that difficulty.51

Any citizen of a liberal society might have a legitimate reason to read the
recruitment literature of ISIS. No one can think intelligently about the
challenge of Islamic radicalism, or of any other illiberal ideology, without
spending at least a little time thinking about it from the inside. More
generally, one cannot think intelligently about evil without entertaining evil
points of view. The fearless, open character that liberal society seeks to
cultivate cannot worry about whether one is permitted to look at this or that.52
Harry Kalven was right that the incitement question is “the area in which
the claims of censorship are at once most compelling and most dangerous to
key values in an open society.”53 The American approach is risky. Most
countries do not do it that way; they unapologetically censor hate speech and
incitement.54 Maybe they have no choice, but they are treating their citizens
as children who are not competent to consider these issues for themselves.
So would we. And for what?

51. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 99 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974)
(1859).
52. See George Kateb, The Freedom of Worthless and Harmful Speech, in LIBERALISM
WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: ESSAYS ON LIBERAL THEORY AND THE POLITICAL VISION OF JUDITH N.
SHKLAR 220, 235 (Bernard Yack ed., 1996).
53. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 119
(1988).
54. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 32–35; Tsesis, supra note 24, at 676.

